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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL:

Let me-- we're expecting some members to join us.

But because the Assembly is going into session shortly, I thought we would start so at least the
would have an opportunity to make an opening statement.

And if she has to leave,

to excuse her and expect her to come back after the assembly session.
Good afternooon.

Today we are

a Joint Hearing of the Senate Energy and Public

Utilities Committee and the Assembly Utilities and Commerce Committee to receive testimony from
the PUC Public Staff regarding its report on how much PG&E ratepayers should be

for the

of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
As you know, the Public Staff, which is responsible for representing the interests of ratepayers,
issued a dramatic and controversial

to the Commission recommending that PG&E's request for

$5.5 billion for the construction of the Diablo Plant be reduced by $4.4 billion. Essentially, the staff
report concluded that PG&E ratepayers should not be charged for Diablo Construction costs caused
by PG&E management - or
Our

today is neither intended to endorse the

it.

staff recommendations nor to reject

the committees have asked the Public Staff to describe the mistakes PG&E made during
construction and to explain how this record of PG&E mismanagement should be used to

determine rates.

Ultimately, the

commissioners will have to choose between two dramatic

scenarios: PG&E's request for full recovery of the $5.5 billion it cost to build the plant, or the Public
Staff recommendation.

In 198 2, I toured the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant to see firsthand what all the fuss was about.
At the time, PG&E was awash in controversy over construction mismanagement, cost overruns, and
safety questions.

As PG&E tour guides explained which parts of the plant had to be reconstructed,

due to mistakes in the blueprints, I asked a simple question: "Who got fired?" I was told no one had
been.
discovered that

I

response was misleading. Someone, in fact, was let go.

A member of the PG&E

Assurance Team who raised concerns about

instructed to

and was later told there was no more work for him at the

even

other

the
were

overtime. He is now

PG&E.

When one reads this report, it becomes apparent that this reckless
pervasive.

was

about

was

In fact, the report notes that PG&E management intimidated the Quality Assurance

Department to the point that it was reluctant to forward engineering audits critical of the safety of
the pla.11t.
What are we dealing with here?
a massive

Not

cost overruns, but public safety. As the PUC report

near the plant, which is not farfetched, could result in the release of

deadly radioactive materials if the Diablo plant was not designed to withstand the shock.
While I understand that this :report is being used as the basis for determining how much
ratepayers should be charged for the Diablo Plant, an equally important issue is raised by the report's
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that's

Commission's-

Nuclear

the review for the construction

a

into

the

for the mistakes made

that

decision on Diablo rates.
attitude attributed

that the callous

continue -- not continue -- now that we have the
can

afford the additional costs of the Diablo
that would result from a nuclear disaster.
you may

at this

like to add a few comments to the ones that

between values

California:
the creation
and

the conflict over the economic

characterized the

of mammoth and

built on an

where

mixed up
far.

to start up, we held
to the

the

and now

followed interim

process

the

in

the last word on the case,
The

it

us to

a

culture that caused some of the mistakes and

~t;uuuu~t;

of the cure. We

to hear about this in

and distinct from ~"'"'"4""'';:.. how to
indeed there are losses.

This is ultimately an issue of

that we deal with in our legislative careers simply

staff's recommendation that PG&E absorb the lion's

share of the cost resulting from the mistakes and delay. But I also wish to make it clear that the full
cannot be determined solely by legalisms. This Legislature can and will make the
framework and the legal framework within which this case will be decided.
The conclusion of this report is only a stage in the ultimate decision of how California's
economy absorbs the immense investment of time and money made in Diablo Canyon. I expect to
hear

the PUC what their intentions are as far as maintaining the continuity and the integrity of

the Diablo

ect team in processing the case.

I'm very much interested, Senator, in hearing the comments of the Public Staff and from the
executive director, the Public Utilities Commission, because I think the report is only the beginning.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much.
We will now start with Victor Weisser, the Executive Director of the California Public Utilities
Commission.
MR. VICTOR R. WEISSER: Thank you. Chairman Rosenthal and Chairwoman Moore, Members,
I'm Vic Weisser, the Executive Director of the California Public Utilities Commission. And on behalf
of the Commission, I want to thank you for this opportunity to have our Public Staff division present
their Diablo

report to you.

I want to first make sure at this juncture that everyone recognizes that the Public Staff's
recommendations were developed independent of the five commissioners and have not been endorsed
them. To put the report in perspective, it's the result of a two and a half year examination by our
Public Staff and its consultants.
been

The Public Staff is that part of the Commission's staff which has

the responsibility to represent the interests of all ratepayers, the long-term interests.

That means agricultural ratepayers, small and large business customers, residential consumers,
everyone, for this year and for as long into the future as we can predict.
In a real sense, the
submissions

the

is the start of a process, not the end of it; because

and other interested parties, it will be the subject of vigorous debate and
until the

of 1989, before the matter is finally submitted to the

commissioners for their ultimate consideration.
but
General's

with the

a

The Public Staff's recommendations will be an
Other parties, such as TURN and the

will have other recommendations which will demand and receive full consideration.

The Commission has made it clear its intent to treat Diablo Canyon not in the fashion as
business as usual.

Barely two weeks after the Public Staff released its report, the Commission held

an en bane pre-hearing conference to explore with all the parties ideas for scheduling and managing
the hearings necessary to thoroughly investigate the issues that this matter raises. All commissioners
participated in this unprecedented pre-hearing conference and heard the parties present their
suggestions as to the issues which need to be covered and the techniques that could be used to focus
the hearings. The Commission made it abundantly clear its desire for the parties to avoid the use of
dilatory tactics which could unnecessarily drift, drag, or delay the proceeding and directed the
parties to meet and confer, to achieve as far as possible, agreement as to a logical grouping of the
issues to be heard so that they could be covered in a logical sequence.
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be
very

notice will

fo:r the

to :review and react to. The

and overlapping manner so as to enable the
Each issue will be kicked off with an en bane
conclude with

arguments

to the

indicated their desire to be
to conclude in March

Barnett to

with

decision to

the case, assisted

the case up to now.
ensure the

at

And a

other

type of support.

we

into

judges plus solid, technical support
and the

nature of the Diablo

in a

and

to you now Bill Ahern who's the Director of our Public
Diablo team

the Public

Weisser.

Moore.

a

m terms of when you feel the
from now,
correct.

schedule -- 21-month schedule.
that's a

up of the schedule that was

administrative law
the schedule, still

looking to the
the

of all

fashion.
at this point, in terms of the recommendation to
involved-- would be 21 months?

4-

MR. AHERN:

Assemblywoman Moore, it was really the Diablo Canyon

Senator

with the San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant and the Helms Creek Pump Storage project,
the three projects that have had tremendous cost overruns that had motivated the Commission and
the Public Utilities Commission Staff Management to create the Public Staff division as a separate
of the Commission's staff that was

to be critical of the Utility applications that came

in """'""'"·!:'. for the money for these projects and to represent the best long-run interests of the Utility

customers.
And

far, the Diablo

team on this.

project has been our largest project and we

And I would like the

results of our study.

a special staff

members of the Staff team to present to you actually the

Bruce DeBerry is the manager of the technical staff, and he'll give you the

and discuss the rate

on customers and the financial impacts on the

company. Counsel Ed O'Neill will

to you the Hosgri Fault issue. And counsel Steve Weissman

of the project team will present to you the Quality Assurance and Mirror Image problem areas.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. DeBerry.
MR. BRUCE DE BERRY: Senator Rosenthal, Chairwoman Moore, Diablo Canyon, a commercial
costs approximately $5.5 billion.

Of this amount, the Public Staff Division recommends

that about $1.15 billion be allowed in rates.
$4.4 billion.

This amounts to a recommended disallowance of

This cost comparison is shown in Figure 1.

The average cost of

that began construction in the late 1960s and the early 1970s was about $720
million. Diablo Canyon is by far the most costly and the most lengthy of nuclear power plants that
would be done

this time period.

Our recommendation is based on three major issues or findings: The first is PG&E should have
Fault before it began construction of the plant and should have incorporated the

found the
seismic

of this fault into its seismic design; secondly, even when the Hosgri Fault was

known and had been discovered and was publicized, PG&E did not respond to the implications of the
fault on its

u"''"~~>:...

until it was forced to by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; thirdly, the

such as the Mirror

Error, and the other errors that resulted in thousands of modifications

should not have occurred.
PG&E has

that customers pay the entire $5.5 billion of total cost at completion. This

amounts to about a 20 percent increase in rates without Diablo Canyon.
construction in 1968. At that time,

Diablo Canyon

-yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There's a question from Assemblywoman.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I just have one question, and I'm sorry to interrupt your line of
thought but I may have to leave and there's some questions that are just -- I'm just dying to ask.
MR. DE BERRY: Okay.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Got to know the answer to.
The first thing -- what was the PUC's role, the ones- how come you didn't make PG&E deal
with the
""''""nonu

Fault? What was the role of the PUC? I mean since you- your report implies that
knew the fault was there; there was a lot of information that the fault was there.
-5-

them to continue to go forth without

person to answer this would be Mr.

who's

Fault.
you have to consider the

of

years, to really understand the answer to your

for

a

to PG&E

Plant. But the Commission was not
the plant.

for

That was

PG&E's

it not seem logical that as the agency
establishment of the

that you would

an EIR which

and seismic information?
The Environmental Impact
So
order to

did not have to do an EIR or an EIS.
a certificate from the Public Utilities

the NRC, on the information that PG&E gave us. We
was an area of low seismicity and that there were no
it turned out that that was incorrect.

me is that you had the

but no

--I mean

of safeguards and being sure that
going on if you .••
to review PG&E's

auu~J''-"'~

And back in the

and there were
better or worse, relied on
nl"n.r<>rl

to be inaccurate and

in a number

that
as
with PG&E.
studies.

was

issued

So neither the NRC nor the

relied on PG&E and it was

responsibility to do

real concern I have then is that if you had the
guess the protection of the

of the State, it

would certainly lead you to verification of that which you
when you shift the entire burden to PG&E -- and
But I guess I

have a real concern; it's real difficult

comfortable in the fact that they had no role and no

6-

in this.

real
MR.

I don't think we feel comfortable about it, and I don't think the NRC feels

comfortable about it. The fact of the matter is neither the NRC nor the PUC is ever going to have
with the right expertise to review each and every management decision that PG&E
m

or building a plant like Diablo.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

But we're not talking about little, minute management.

We're

about the very foundation upon which this plant, a nuclear power plant, was to be built and
that -- I mean you

have to have a

staff to do that. I just, you know, have a real concern

that from the very beginning I'm equally as interested in the role of the PUC as the-- as PG&E.
MR.

Well, these are good questions. And I think, as this case proceeds, we'll probably

learn more about what the PUC could have done in the early days, perhaps to avoid the problem or
the problems earlier. And we'll probably learn more about what the NRC and the USGS could
have done earlier.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Is that what you're going to tell me?
MR. O'NEILL:

Well, yeah.

But I think it is important to remember here the primary

was and still is PG&E's to design and build and operate that plant safely.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I'm not eliminating that.

But again, one of the reasons that we

have state agencies or regulatory agencies are because we don't necessarily believe that those people
that they're regulating are going to do all the things they're supposed to do because they're obligated;
and, of course, you know, for oversight and, you know, jurisdiction of those authorities, we look to
those state agencies that have that, that power and that mission and that duty.
MR. O'NEILL: Well, that's correct. We're always going to have to rely though to some degree,
or lesser degree, on information filed by applicants like PG&E. And if that information

to a

and is not accurate .••

is not

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I don't want to continue to go round and round because -MR. O'NEILL:

thank you.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -we're not •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN DAN HAUSER:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to follow up on that same

Given that PG&E started an earlier facility at Bodega Bay and invested quite a bit of money in
a

hole in the ground only to abandon it when somebody figured out that San Andreas happened

to be a few yards away, you would think that the Utility themselves would be very interested in
seismic issues.
Was there any excuses, legitimate excuses, presented by the Utility to justify their not having
spent the time and energy and effort to identify potential seismic hazards within the area?
MR.

We tried to review and evaluate the excuses for not doing thorough geo-seismic

studies in preparing our analysis.

And as you can tell from reviewing our report, as you obviously

have, we didn't find their excuses convincing.

You know, there were plenty of reasons why PG&E

-7-

it was a coastal site and

had no

There was evidence of
the existence of offshore faults in 1966. And
southwest of the plant in
of reasons

, one of the
PG&E to do

gee-

reasons which PG&E has given for not

those

Farr.
as we're on this point and we're

a

the frustration that I think

all

in the State Legislature which deals so much with law
we have a situation where you have a

-- and by

business in the state, and a commission, a regulatory commission -been said and done,

got this incredible gap of

to be returned.

billion

an incredible screw up, and the

what I - I think we all find it's sort of like the mobile
It's now a

game of CY A.

And I think that what

this is that how -- what can be done to make sure that
this far -- $4.4 billion

that

my God, if -- that's

back to all the taxpayers in California, three times as much,
amount of money. And I -- the frustration I feel -- I think
Committee and others-- is how the hell could this

at least to part of your comment.

that is the

us to be able to go out and to hire
in fact, to my

there are

to them some outside consultants who are
to these
to

k . H. . . . . . " '

recommendations about how we don't ever
in

it's all

that are underway and will be
Let me ask a question here.
and operation at $5.1 billion?

5?

the commercial operation .•.
I mean that's not a disputed amount?

- 8-

there
there must be
in the future.

MR. DE BERRY:
the amount

Well, when we say that that's -- that's really just an accounting figure. It's

actually recorded on the books of the company as of the cost of the plant.

we have a tremendous dispute with the company with regard to the amount that should be
to ratepayers, in rates.
ASSEMBLYMAN FARR: And your recommendation is the $1.15?
MR. DE BERRY: That's correct. I think we probably should add •••
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblyman Sher, a question.
ASSEMBLYMAN BYRON D. SHER:

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I'd like -- instead of

-- first of all, I want to apologize for coming in late. I was dealing with a bill up in

a

& Means. But I would like, with your indulgence, to make a brief statement about this general

ect which is primarily a message for the PUC, which I think is appropriate in this context.
As many of you know, in 1985, I authorized- I authored Assembly Bill1776 which is referred to
in the background paper that the members have received.

That bill was an attempt to bring some

semblance of order to the law governing the conduct of reasonableness reviews of large utility
projects.

The bill passed the Legislature by a wide margin; it was signed by Governor

and is now the law.
Diablo Canyon.

This legislation was motivated specifically by the experience at

And although Pacific Gas & Electric initially opposed the bill, after we amended

some of the language, they withdrew their opposition. So the bill passed without the opposition of the

u
Section 2 of the bill directs the PUC to specifically address two major issues: The Hosgri Fault
and the lack of Quality Assurance, and explicitly to identify the costs associated with these two
or

The Public Staff's report responds to that directive, and it should be considered very
the PUC under the standards contained in Assembly Bill 1776. AB 1776, as I say, is the

law.

And I and other concerned legislators who voted for that bill expect the PUC to follow the

mandates of that law. AB 1776 mandates that the PUC not make utility customers pay for the costs
that result from unreasonable mistakes of utility managers in planning, construction, or operation of
construction

ects. The PUC must understand what that standard of conduct is. Some have

PUC

the standard of AB 1776 in the Songs (?) case and the Palo Verde case and

in the

rate portion of the Diablo Canyon case. I think it's important that the PUC not ignore

the law

its consideration, its final consideration, in the Diablo Canyon case.

The issue is:

What is an unreasonable mistake by the utility?

And we and the ratepayers in

California have a right to expect that at a minimum, utility managers meet legally required standards
of conduct and that they exercise their discretion prudently so as to avoid reasonably foreseeable
costs and harms.
And I think what the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said when it suspended the Diablo Canyon
operating license in 1981 is pertinent here, and I'm going to quote exactly what they said, and I'm
quoting:

"Contrary to statements made in PG&E's operating license application, certain structures,

systems, and components important to safety at the plant may not be properly designed to withstand
the

of earthquakes and further indicates that violation of NRC's regulations and 10 CSFR,

-9-

that statement.
been known to the Commission on or
have been issued until the

to

raised had

license to load fuel and so forth.
half years to complete satisfactorily the actions that
us a detailed

that

of the costs that this

was not -- there was no anti-nuclear
ect in-- when it

of the

the

It was no anti-nuclear demonstrator who

PG&E

These are mistakes of the Utility in the conduct

Assurance

any reasonable person would consider these mistakes
costs,
does not excuse the Utility's
too

The

the brunt of
of the bill is

purposes of establishing rates, the Commission shall
the direct or indirect costs resulting from any unreasonable error or
caused by any unreasonable error or
mistakes are too great, the PUC ought to disallow those

"

for
the law to

that in and

relief because

unreasonable mistakes is expensive. I think the consequences
dollar bailout are
consider in this

were answered

greater than most of
So

Asemblyman

to me, is a very

so I would pass

Mr. Chairman, Members, you stated that the
the 1927 quake and as regards to the Shell Oil Company

inf o:rm a tion about the 19 2 7

when they

They did have information that a very
10-

7.3 occurred southwest of the plant offshore. They weren't certain of the
but

had enough information that a large fault existed, large enough

to cause that earthquake, that they should have looked offshore. That was one of roughly five basic
reasons

should have looked offshore.

Now with regard to the Shell Oil Company data, Shell collected the offshore data from which
the

Fault was discovered in the early to mid-1960s. PG&E wasn't aware of Shell's
as far as we can tell.
their

in January of

2.,

article until the Fall of

The Shell oil geologist that identified the Hosgri Fault

1. As far as we can tell, PG&E wasn't aware of this
two years after it was published. We believe they could have had

access to the Shell Oil Company information, had they asked Shell about it, virtually at any time
that time

But we

sometime in

believe they actually did have access to the Shell data until

which was the first time that they went and asked Shell to review the data.

ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE:

That being the case, wouldn't it also have been reasonable for

the PUC to have had this same information?
The PUC had some information about the 1927 earthquake. It was disclosed on a

MR.

map that was filed with the Public Utilities Commission in the 1960s.
is the PUC

The fact of the

appreciate the significance of the 1927 earthquake. The PUC also didn't

any oil company data.
of.

So to some degree, you know, we had an opportunity which we

But on the other hand, we didn't have geologists reviewing PG&E's

either. And we relied on their statement that the area was free of earthquake faults in
the immediate

and was in area of low seismicity. We basically relied on the representations

made
ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE: Without backup material?
In retrospect, that was a mistake.
LONGSHORE: On

ROSENTHAL:

part?

Well, let me just comment that the PG&E informed the NRC that

considered offshore
ASSEMBLY MAN

to be unnecessary.
That's true, Mr. Chairman, but on the same token, what

here is that I'm not questioning the $4.1 billion or the amount of the decision of the
members as regards as to how this should be distributed.

What I'm saying is that with that fore-

it would have been prudent and reasonable for the PUC to have denied their license until

had received the proper backup information. That would also have been reasonable. And I would
think that the reasonableness here was kind of lost on both sides of the part, to some extent.
the extent

What

I'm not certain. And I'm not taking sides. I'm just merely --

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah.
ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE: -- showing that there was a lack of a diligence as far as PUC is
concerned as well.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

I ask one question?

-11-

Moore.
same line with PG&E

to have hired the best

at what point -- I mean
-

you have

is that all we can ask of a company, is that
get from the people that you, as the PUC

know- you

the expense?

Does their response -

contractor and adherence to their

Management
clear:

doesn't

there. But

PG&E did not follow the advice of their
there were

underwater

PG&E didn't do any underwater

any-- the area offshore-- for any faulting activity. Later, after the Hosgri
F

take that point.

then you can see the dilemma that I see that exists.
was submitted to you when they submitted their
be underwater -- why didn't the PUC make them do

have the same recommendations. The

that was

The report that was prepared

by

underwater geology be done to investigate the various faulted
VA''l£.'·'-

study. The report that was filed with the PUC, I

indicated that some underwater geology should be
which is an entirely different

of

done?

was the PUC?
or
that PG&E filed.

or

the work at

The PUC issued a decision based on

our review

We

periodic

out there looking over PG&E's shoulders whatsoever.
Commission.
Were there any requests made by the PUC of PG&E
would have lent itself to further information regarding the Hosgri
F

anything in our review that was

in that

made. There were requests made by the agencies

lZ-

alifornia that were

nature. I believe the California Resources Agency got
work.

from PG&:E to do
commitment.

It wasn't real specific; it was a general

And as far as we are concerned, based on our review, that general commitment was

But other than that, we

found any requests that weren't complied with.

g

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator

do you have another question?

Your light was on; I

know.
GREEN: Oh, sorry.
ROSENTHAL: All

MR.

BERRY:

If there are no further questions, why don't you continue

Thank you, Senator.

and of the

I'll continue with a very short history, both of the

that we conducted.
construction in 1968.

Diablo
million for the two units.

And the first unit was estimated to be in operation in 1972. The actual

some 18 years

of course, was the $5.5 billion. This delay and substantial cost overrun

because the

completed three times.

can refer you to
which ends

the first completion spans the period that is identified as original

<>n'n""'"v'

, the Nuclear

In

At that time, its estimated total cost was $320

in 1976. In 1976, that cost at that time was approximately $1
Commission then required PG&:E to modify the plant in order
Fault and the effects on its seismic design as a result of

into account the

that second period of completion, called "Redesign for Hosgri Fault," the cost at

that fault.
end was

billion. The third completion occurred as a result of the discovery of

Mirror

Error and the other design errors. That period we've identified is the correction of

""'"'''""'" errors, and that spanned the

until the operation of the two units in 1985 and 1986 in the

billion. We should point out that PG&:E has applied for an additional $300 million in plan
the

billion that we've identified at commercial operation.

Staff division

began in May of 1984.

The team over this time has varied

it has consisted of around 14 professional individuals in fields of economics,

and
Because

of state

that provided reimbursement from

through PG&E's

the Public Staff was able to hire expert consultants to assist in the study.
interviewed approximately 130 consultants in various fields.

We

We have employed during the study

consultants in fields such as engineering, construction, finance, nuclear licensing,
seismic design, and other fields that are related to the design and construction of a nuclear
power

The study itself required about three years to complete. It comprises 62 volumes of
and is about 17,000 pages long. As was pointed out by Assemblyman Sher, we

have followed the legislation that was contained in Assembly Bill 1776 regarding the identification of
the costs for the Hosgri Fault, as one issue; and the second issue of the Mirror Image Error and the
related

Assurance Program.

We want to

out that our review is based strictly on management performance. In making
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to as a reasonable
c.uua.ru

based on

standard. This standard
The standard considers what

decision makers at the time they made their decisions and what
makers at the time that they made their
as the fact that Diablo Canyon is a nuclear power

we also made an

in the

We concluded that PG&E could continue
cost and that it would also be able to continue to

--~----question.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Assemblywoman.
was

to ask you a question about all the talent that you
a great deal of work on this case,

at the

see.
we go forward on the rest of the case in terms of
economics?

Does that -- does the team

together or

answer to your question is yes, the team stays

our

of, I believe, one year with two years of renewal-

a

that they will be with us obviously through the
with regard to the- whether or not the team remains

How much are we paying for the team, so to speak?

How much

a little differently.
and how much more do they

before the

As of the

of that

.4 million in

costs.

Now

there are the staff costs of the persons who are from the
haven't made an exact calculation. That's probably
would be about another million and a half dollars.
think that up and to date that PUC has probably
case?
''"''u"""~

MOORE:

BERRY: At this

both staff and its consultants.
Now what would you- could you wager a guess on how

we':re aware of some expenditures by PG&E. We do not know if
- 14-

that

at

case.
your entire budget, PUC budget?

on the case to date, as much as the PUC

to your spending by the PUC.
amount of money that you're

,~•:::u,.~.u,,~

given the magnitude of the

er:~:n<m<u:r:!g

to put on the
that they're

that we do not have a maximum limit with regard to the

for our consultants. However, we should point out that nevertheless
to remain within some reasonable limits. As we identify
how much should be the cost that we will need
in

not

will make but that have

a very

believe it's one of the most extensive studies of its

that

at least in volume.

of questions.

'"'"''·....,.,c::

2 and asked how much it cost to reconstruct portions of the
that I raised the issue about the Mirror

of

that. I was given labor and material costs which were

cause the costs to escalate
which

re:teJrrin!J you to our

see that the recorded cost at that time was
that there was a substantial

of

direct

the top line.
PG&E has

that the Staff Report is biased

been critical of the Diablo Plant

the NRC

best consultants that we could find. And I think they've done
criticism was

I might add, before they had read one word of our

that our study has nothing to do with questions concerning
should be built.
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It has to do with economics.

The

been.

sure everyone that has any

nuclear power one way or the other. PG&E

30 consultants

an anti-nuclear bias. Frankly, I think that is a pretty good
that the criticism was leveled before they'd read

And in our
ROSENTHAL:

!JUJL>v•••

the real test is in the report itself.

It's been stated

some that the dramatic size of the Staff's

because of the size of it.
under the

out that we were

the costs of two major events. And those two events

to
Fault and the
discovered

that

errors and the Mirror Image Error that were

and later on. We have identified those costs. Furthermore, it's our

that unreasonable costs should not be

for

ratepayers. We believe that those are unreasonable

their
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Can I ask-- okay.
HAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Longshore.

I have one more question.

ASSEMBLYMAN LONGSHORE:

did the building -- was PG -

How much at the mercy of the

how constrained were they in that

upon the contractors?
O'NEILL:

out that the major cost overruns that occurred at

the Diablo

to do with the contractors per se.

ln

in the geo-seismic studies that accounted for the

second

shown on that figure to my right; and also,

were

were due to

events alone were really within the management control
were involved in the construction. But what we found in our studies
responsibility for the decisions that led to those

could elaborate on that a bit.
bulk

cost overruns during the latter phase, which was referred to

errors, was

PG&E's failure to implement the Quality Assurance

had committed itself
to a

Assurance
interfacf:

sort. The

its

A Quality Assurance Program is

function, if you will, that the U

and
of

PG&E

with the NRC.

has to undertake

requirements set forth by the NRC to PG&E included that

with outside consultants and contractors, requirements that Quality
be established by the contractors.

Assurance

information should not

In addition, there are certain types of

that should be set up by PG&E -either

which

from PG&E to the consultant or back from the
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check.
the

of that

One of the most graphic illustrations of the
is traced back to a mistake in

that were

one of the Quality Assurance
:review take

at the contractor level.

of time that

PG&E auditors were

specifically

any

were considered to be a
u"'"l='"' on their own.

discriminate between highly
Assurance

set up

And it was

~~·.~~.,~ ...

and those

that aspect of their

with

Mirror Image problem.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Moore.
want to kind

go back to the

to see the Diablo
tell us that it was

And in

with the

I think, about 34 pipes that had to be changed; that
a

that

what the Mirror

that were

to

built to hold a

and to hold it in place; and that those
and not under the system that it was
and the

to be
amounted

of those pipes would have

your Public Staff report, you claim that it was over Z
should

be responsible.

account with yours?
itself was really

the

The U

of the
had been

And one
that there was this Mirror
structure.
series

of

stemming

from

Mirror
unlabeled

was
drawings

failure to check the
up. And after that mistake was
at
ASSEMBLYWOMAN

Diablo Canyon plant. And, in fact, the Mirror

informal

a proposed
a harder look
problem

Was that done by PG&E, or was that done by the-- by the-- by

done
the

and

contractors hired by PG&E with the

ents of the harder look actually were performed by the
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NRC,

believe.
MOORE: So

the company come forward, then we would have never

what I'm
WEISSMAN:

it's hard to say how these problems would have surfaced; but the

turned out to be so
several weeks of

that they would have come up one way or another.

Within

""u""" the Mirror

auditors discovered at least 14 major areas where

at the

Assemblyman Sher quoted from the NRC as to their

there were

known about these errors in

never would have issued the license had
advance.

only two of the errors, the staff of the NRC said exactly

after

If we had known about these two errors, we would not have recommended that the

the same
license be issued
But what

is that after the succession of errors was discovered, it became clear that

there were some underlying problems with engineering management and with the implementation of
A reasonable Quality Assurance Program would have avoided these

the Quality Assurance

errors, or at least would have led to their detection so they could have been corrected in a timely
basis.
MOORE: Let me ask this-- it's my understanding that
of the

Assurance and

of the Quality

fault problem was that the plant was initially built based on

another fault that was some distance away and was built to withstand an earthquake had it occurred
at the- what is it-- San Andreas Fault as opposed to the Hosgri Fault.

Is that
MR.

to that.

Let me
on a number of faults.

The plant was actually designed to withstand

But the critical fault- rather, the critical earthquake for the

an

that PG&E assumed could occur beneath the plant

beneath the

site.

studies.

The problem with that assumption was that it was based on

And as it turned out, the existence of the Hosgri Fault, some three
of a very large earthquake on that fault, proved to
than PG&E had

-- I guess what I was trying to

essence that the

the

to this

You

all that was that m

was built was faulty. And ••.

I mean- and according to that,

built according

saying to me is that had a Quality Assurance Program

And what
would that have had any

MR. O'NEILL:

to

what

correct.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

been

a

used.
what I -- what I

MR. O'NEILL:

roughly

on that?

A Quality Assurance Program probably would have had no effect on the gee-

seismic studies.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

Because it would have only been to look at the plant as it was

constructed and built?
- 18-

The

Assurance programs required by the NRC had the most

actual construction activities
process.

also

the site. But Quality Control and

Assurance was

As far as I'm aware, Quality Assurance and

to

studies but in a less formal fashion.

At least it's our

have made any difference in the geo-seismic area. It certainly would have
made

deal of difference with

to the design problems that Mr. Weissman

covered.

MOORE: I guess the thing that I keep hearing from you is that there were
And I guess according to reading the

deficiencies.

that

or each of these deficiencies has led to the cost overruns and therefore we come to the

conclusion that you have.
an you be very
based on

-- are you that comfortable in making that kind of a conclusion

that the deficiencies were solely theirs and .••

MR.

Well, there are always lots of factors that come into play in a complex

construction

ect like the Diablo

anyon project.

And I think our study succeeded in

overruns and schedule
mean we found

very
in the

control area.

root
those

of management, not just in the gee-seismic area or
We found management deficiencies in the project management, work

schedule

force

What we looked for were the

cost control, budgeting.

Almost everywhere we looked, we

found
And if your

is are we comfortable that we have found the basic, root cause of the cost

overruns, I think we would all agree that we have.
there are

to be

Certainly, when you look at particular issues,

other contributing factors.

But I think the basic causes have been

management problems.
MOORE:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

or in

Would you like to continue with any further

we

"""'"'"'''· if you are interested, in providing a little more detail

the

the deficiencies in
have covered much of that material in response

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, you have.
Would you like
MR.
what

summarize?

BERRY: Let me

summarize again what our position is with

to our study and

recommended.
our

has found that :ratepayers should not pay for unreasonable costs.

We have

determined that the-- of the $5.5 billion that PG&E expended as a commercial operation on the two
units at Diablo Canyon, that ratepayers should only pay for $1.15 billion of cost.
well

I

this

And as has been

we have found that this cost is a :result of three major issues or
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The

of these is that PG&E should have found the

its-- the effects of the

Fault

Fault and should have

its seismic design, in

construction.

when the fault was discovered and had been made known, PG&E did not
the fault. In

to

with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission over the effects of

the fault and insisted that their seismic

was adequate.

we believe that the Mirror
in

tremendous

Error and the other design errors that

to the

of 1981 and thereafter, should not have occurred.

based on

we believe that it is reasonable

for

And

to pay

.15 billion of cost for that plant.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I've heard that the PUC might welcome a settlement of this case in
What safeguards will be used in the settlement to ensure that all

order to avoid

effective interests could effectively participate?
Mr. Weisser.
MR. WEISSER:

Any settlement discussions that are undertaken in the future, if they lead to a

proposal, would have to be

to the Commission and subject to a complete and thorough

hearing process to ensure that all parties' interests are protected, period.

There will be no

settlement that will be arrived at that will not undergo any, you know, the type of intensive scrutiny
to ensure that all interests are

and that the ratepayers are protected and all intervening

parties have an opportunity to
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblywoman.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I had a couple of questions. The first was that it appears that-Vic, don't go away 'cause one of these is going to be for you-- the-- you-- in your report, you
indicated that the-- in actuality, PG&E built three plants and you've only decided to fund one; and
that was the first that should have been completed in 1973.
Is that

-- is that

MR. DE BERRY:

what your recommendation is?

our recommendation is based on the fact that PG&E did, in
as I indicated earlier.

The three

and the correction of the

include the
errors after

1981.
Now our

our recommendation, is that the

have been

at the time of original construction, which would have been in
1976. And

at that

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
PG&E for
other

the

of the plant would have been about $1.1 billion.

Now that conclusion would appear to me that you totally fault

Their contentions that there was some government delays and a variety of
that were not -- that

had which are over -- which they had no control -- were

major contributing factors to the length of time of the play.
Does that -- your conclusion indicate that you totally disregard it or felt that that had no
merit?
MR. DE BERRY:

Well, our conclusion, as Mr. O'Neill indicated earlier, is based on what we
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to

the factors that

controlled.

have control over and that, in fact, management could have

And these were basic issues

Control and

with geo-seismic questions and also with Quality

Assurance that led to the Mirror Image and other design errors.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

I guess, of course, hearing that and then the questions that

evolved from that are one- that some that I heard from some junior high school students who raised
the

Who was

total

PG&E? And you come back to the PUC and yet you have shifted the

over there.
is more directed to you,

And it's one that--

the size of this case--

like none that we've never had in the history, given the dollars that are involved-- given the time
that has

during this

be the interest of the public would be better served if there were -- the

it

you

and the involvement of the PUC over the years with the case -- do

process was somewhat altered from the norm and perhaps we brought in a masters-type judge
that -- to

the case? Because there are many legal points that are going to be

and I just

would like to hear some comment on that. And could that fit into the time frame that you set forth
of 21 months?
MR. WEISSER:

Chairwoman

let me give you some off-the-cuff initial reactions.

confident that the Commission has
ensure that we

the type of resources, in terms of people on the case, to

a

or not we

to the Commission. We looked at the question of whether

want to utilize a

master or special masters for portions of the case,

technical
and

I'm

of the case, and the belief of the PUC's management--

is the chief administrative law judge, myself, and other judges that we conferred with, was

that that would not be a

issue.

me cite an

W.I-JIJV<>c::

you were to attempt to hire a special master or utilize a
issues.

with that sort of

You would tend to

to find

a

What you would be ending up with would

in my

in with per haps certain preconceptions regarding the
at

We think we're best off bringing in an

law

complex cases that would be able to

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

WEISSER:

I'm

an ..•

guess the question is: How do we find at the PUC an

of the administrative law judges that we ..•

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

I mean this is not-- I don't want you to run back and say Gwen

Moore is knocking administrative law

But it's a real question. And I'm

that there's not

a person in the PUC that probably doesn't have some opinion about the Diablo, Diablo proceedings,
the Diablo case, the Diablo issue. And I guess that's what I'm really, you know, trying, trying to get
at. And this case, everybody has some interest in it; everybody has some stake in it because of the
long-range implications for the entire state.
have to look at

And it's of such a magnitude that I think that we may

a little differently than we normally do, particularly because it has

on for so long.
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to deal with this case is
that we select who are

you

I want to assure you

law

on the basis of the people's

whatever sort of front-end
this case, in

abilities to

themselves above

experience and that the judges that

have shown

in

to

their experience that they're capable and

and

and litigious issues such as that which we face.
MOORE: The first judge that handled a

deal of this is

the
MR.

He is

next year--

but we will be contracting with him for assistance

the case-- on a part-time basis.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
allowance were to

the

He will act as an assistant to the

Let me ask another question, another issue here.

the

PG&E's financial position, wouldn't it eventually only serve to hurt

ratepayers?
MR. DE BERRY:
as I
Our

with regard to the financial implications of our recommendation
out

that was, in fact, one of the reasons why we wanted to make this

has indicated that the two-- the first issue is that we believe that

could still

be able to finance its construction program at a reasonable cost.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

but how much more-- when you go to borrow money, what is

the difference in percentage that you might have to pay?

And doesn't that become a cost of the

ratepayer?
MR. DE BERRY: We, in our study, have found that approximately -- this is

an

it's based on various assumptions because we've had to assume that the market would do certain
things. We

know

now exactly what the market will do in the

with

both

to the stock and to the cost of issuing bonds or debt. We have found that the additional cost will be
we have also found that that additional cost would
in the form of additional,
deals
of

costs due

a

which has to do with the
and the

debt that the company would

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I
MR. DE BERRY:
Let me

at

know what that means.

I realize that's -- it's a somewhat of a complicated issue.

answer your

would flow through to

that we do not believe

the additional costs

And I can explain that to you if you'd like me

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Over a period of the life of that plant?
MR. DE BERRY:

correct.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

And finally, in your view, how does the staff report affect

the issue of the interim rates for Diablo?

In other words, on the basis of what the staff is saying,

should those interim rates be reduced?
MR. DE BERRY: On the basis of what the staff has presented to date, currently, I believe that
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the commission to adopt what we have recommended-- there would be a slight reduction in
current interim rates.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Anything further that you would like to add in your presentation?
MR.

______: Thank you very ...

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I want to thank you for this presentation.

Didn't get a

chanc~

to

thank all of those assembly persons who were here and had to go back-- they're in session on the
sure we'll be talking about this issue for the next 21 months at least. And I thank you very
for

Thank you.

MR. O'NEILL: Thank you for the opportunity.
MR. DE BERRY: Thank you, Senator.

--oOo--
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